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This paper examines the role of inequality in the provision of public goods. County level data
from the U.S. in 1890 provides comparable units of analysis operating with similar property
tax systems, ensuring that we do not empirically confuse dierences in tax systems with dif-
ferences in public goods provision. Climatic data is used as an instrument for land inequality
to provide identication of the eect of inequality. The results indicate that land inequality
caused signicantly lower overall property tax rates. This eect is driven almost exclusively
by the eect of land inequality on taxes related directly to schooling. In contrast, non-school
funding was not signicantly aected by inequality. While informative about the eect of land
inequality on public goods provision, an examination of the details of the tax system suggests
that these results should not necessarily be taken as a rejection of median voter predictions.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide a careful empirical test of the relationship between public goods
provision and inequality, and to consider what conclusions can usefully be drawn regarding the
median voter model. County level data on property taxes and inequality from the U.S. in 1890
provides the context for the test, and it has three features that separate it from previous empirical
work. First, the structure of the tax system is homogenous across counties in this period, in that
they all relied almost exclusively on property taxes to fund their public goods. Second, the property
tax is a wealth tax, and this matches the theoretical structure of median voter models better than
data based on income taxation. Third, the historical record allows one to distinguish redistribution
from public goods provision, two concepts that are often taken to be synonymous in models but
diering in reality. Prior empirical work has relied primarily on cross-country data and aside from
concerns on the comparability of this data, there is not sucient knowledge of the tax systems
themselves to draw useful conclusions regarding inequality and redistribution.
An additional contribution is to clearly identify the role of inequality for the provision of public
goods. Wealth inequality is measured by a Gini coecient of farm sizes within counties, and I
adopt the historical arguments of Engerman and Sokolo (1997) and Sokolo and Engerman (2000)
to generate a set of instruments for this measure of inequality.1 They argue that initial climatic
conditions were central to dierences in inequality across the Western Hemisphere. I create county-
level instruments for the farm Gini from several climatic variables and use this to provide exogenous
variation in inequality.2
The empirical analysis focuses on explaining variation in property tax rates, as opposed to
property tax revenues per capita (as in Ramcharan, 2007). This is because tax revenues per capita
depend not only on the political decision of what tax rate to set, but on the tax base, or wealth.
Inequality may be associated with lower property taxes per capita, but this may simply be because
160% of all wealth in 1890 consisted of farmland, according to the U.S. Census report on Wealth, Debt, and
Taxation of 1895. Thus land inequality captures a large proportion of inequality in wealth. Additional support for
the use of the Gini coecient for farm size comes from Leland (1928), Benson (1965), and Seligman (1895). All three
note that total wealth of individuals in this period was closely correlated to their farm land holdings in all but the
most urbanized areas.
2Work by Easterly (2001, 2007) and Ramcharan (2007) uses a similar strategy to obtain exogenous variation in
inequality.
2unequal places are also poor. To address the role of inequality in the political economy of taxation
it is necessary to concentrate on the tax rates specically.
The results show that there is a negative eect of land inequality on property tax rates across
counties in the U.S. in 1890. A one standard deviation increase in the Gini coecient of farm
sizes would lower the property tax rate from 1.3% to 1.1% when evaluated at the median, a fteen
percent drop.
Beyond this, the data give us the opportunity to explore how inequality aected taxation as-
sociated with specic public goods, namely schooling. If we examine only the tax rates levied
specically to support schooling, then the negative eects of inequality are even larger, both in sta-
tistical signicance and in the size of the estimates. A one standard deviation increase in the Gini
lowers the property tax rate for schooling from 0.41% to 0.32%, a decline of over twenty percent. In
comparison, if we look at taxes used to fund all non-educational public goods (e.g. roads), then we
nd no signicant relationship with inequality. Land inequality was acting strongly to lower school
funding while it had no contemporary eect on other types of public goods.
These ndings have implications for several lines of research. First and foremost, they highlight
the fact that land inequality acted to depress the accumulation of a factor complementary to in-
dustrial production: human capital.3 At the same time, the evidence shows that this same land
inequality did not signicantly in
uence the provision of other public goods that were complemen-
tary to all sectors. This accords with work by Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2008), who predict this
kind of relationship at early levels of development. The results also provide empirical support for
the historical work of Engerman and Zolt (2005), who documented distinct dierences in taxation
levels between countries in the Western Hemisphere, and associated these dierences with their
initial inequality in land holdings.
Additionally, the results oer some insight into the median voter model of public goods provision,
as in Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Previous research by Lindert (1996), Perotti (1996), Partridge
(1997), Gouveia and Masia (1998), and Rodriguez (1999) found a negative relationship between
3Other papers have documented an empirical relationship of land inequality and agggregate development levels,
such as Deininger and Squire (1998), Birdsall and Londono (1997), and Frankema (2006). However, these papers do
not oer any evidence that this relationship operates through public nance.
3government spending and inequality, and they conclude that the median voter model does not
hold.4 However, most studies have used cross-country data in their work, and this introduces
serious concerns about the comparability of tax systems. It implicitly assumes that the mechanisms
of taxation are similar, and the only major dierences are in the actual tax rates. This seems very
unlikely to be true. A major advantage of this paper is that the units of analysis all operate with
a similar tax system, described in more detail below. All counties in 1890 nanced nearly 100% of
their spending through the general property tax, and there was little variation in the implementation
of this tax across counties. An additional feature of the property taxes studied in this paper is that
they are, by denition, direct taxes on wealth. Median voter models generally focus on wealth
taxes, but most of the existing empirical work is based upon countries that utilize some form of
income tax to fund public goods and redistribution.
With the advantage of consistent data and more detail on the historical context, the results in
this paper can be shown to be compatible with a median voter model once we carefully distinguish
redistribution from public goods provision. Historical evidence shows clearly that in 1890 in the
U.S. the property tax was highly regressive, and this operated through the assessment process. The
assessed value of property did not rise one for one with the market value of estates, so that richer
individuals paid a lower eective tax rate. If the tax system is regressive enough, then as inequality
increases (and the median voter becomes poorer) the implemented tax rate will actually down.
So it would be incorrect to suggest that the evidence presented in this paper shows the median
voter model to be incorrect. The median voter model may be perfectly consistent with a negative
inequality/tax relationship once we account for the actual nature of the tax system the voters have
available. The evidence suggests that the regressivity was a universal feature of the property tax
system. Why property taxes are regressive is beyond the ability of the data in this paper to answer,
but Benabou (2000, 2005) oers a theoretical structure that rationalizes regressive taxation while
still maintaining a median voter assumption.
The results here also provide some insight into the low local and municipal tax rates observed
within many developing countries (Tanzi, 1987; Burgess and Stern, 1993). In these countries, where
4Figini (1998) nds a non-linear relationship between spending and inequality, and Pineda and Rodriguez (2006)
use time-series evidence from the U.S. to argue against the median-voter interpretation of public education funding.
4land remains a signicant source of wealth, an unequal distribution of this resource combined
with structural issues that lead to regressive systems could lead to low levels of taxation and
therefore a limited ability to provide growth-enhancing public goods. Additionally, this paper
adds to the current literature examining institutions within countries in more detail. Banerjee
and Iyer (2005) study the impact of land inequality on dierential development across India, while
Naritomi, Soares, and Assuncao (2007) examine Brazilian municipalities and the development of
their internal institutions in light of their experience with sugar or gold extraction. Acemoglu,
Bautista, Querubin, and Robinson (2007) examine both political inequality and land inequality
in determining long run outcomes for education and public goods across districts of a state in
Colombia. Examining regional evidence across the Western Hemisphere, Bruhn and Gallego (2007)
nd evidence for the importance of institutional quality within countries that mirrors the cross-
country results. The current paper provides further evidence of the importance of initial conditions
for the long-run development of institutions, suggesting that geographic conditions, through their
in
uence on inequality, acted as a drag on human-capital enhancing public goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes in more detail the property tax system and
presents the cross-sectional county level regressions using data from 1890. Section 3 discusses how
to interpret the ndings in light of the median voter model and section 4 concludes.
2 The Relationship of Inequality on Public Goods Provision
Before addressing the empirical issues surrounding the identication of the relationship of inequality
and property taxation, it will be useful to consider how exactly we measure property taxes. Tax
revenues per capita might be attractive as a measure, but note that this potentially confounds
multiple mechanisms through which inequality may exert an in
uence. To see this, note that we










5where T is total property tax revenue, L is population, and V is the market value of property. The
rst ratio, T=V , captures the tax rate, while wealth per capita V=L is the tax base. Any eect that
inequality has on taxes per capita (T=L), has to operate through one of these two channels.











which shows that the log of taxes per capita are simply a linear combination of two terms. Given
this decomposition, it will be the case that the coecients ^  of a linear regression of lnT=L on
explanatory variables X will have to be equal to the sum of the coecients from the regression
of each right-hand side term on the same explanatory variables X. More explicitly, the coecient
on inequality in the regression of lnT=L on X will have to equal the sum of the coecients on
inequality found in regressions of lnT=V and lnV=L on X (Wong, 2007). What this will allow us
to do is examine whether the tax rate (T=V ) or wealth per capita (V=L) was the most important
element in determining the level of tax revenue per capita and its relationship with inequality.
This decomposition is informative, but we must keep in mind two issues while working with it.
First, the political economy of inequality is concerned with tax rates, and therefore our primary
object of interest should be T=V , not taxes per capita, T=L.5 Drawing conclusions from regressions
using tax revenues per capita alone would be inappropriate. The second issue is that the decom-
position of tax revenues per capita does nothing to solve the problem of identication. A set of
instruments for inequality is described below that will give us condence we are nding the causal
eect of inequality on taxation.
2.1 Property Taxes in the United States, 1860-1920
Before proceeding, it will be useful to provide some background on the property tax system in the
United States in this period. The industrialization and modernization of the American economy
5This points out a signicant dierence of the current work with that of Ramcharan (2007), who examines tax
revenues per head in the same period. He nds inequality negatively related to tax revenues per head, but it is
not clear whether this is driven by tax rates or by wealth dierences, and so it is dicult to draw conclusions.
Additionally, while I will argue later that geographic controls can usefully serve as an instrument for inequality when
tax rates are the dependent variable, it is not clear that they are suitable instruments when using taxes per capita,
due to the direct eects of climate characteristics on wealth in a heavily agricultural economy.
6between the middle of the 19th century and the Great Depression coincides with what has been
called \The Era of Property Finance and Municipal Government" by Wallis (2000, 2001). Public
provision of education and infrastructure was an integral element of the rapid development experi-
enced in this era. Between 1902 and 1932 two categories of spending, roads and schools, accounted
for half of all growth in government expenditure. The funding of these projects was provided almost
exclusively by taxes on property. In 1890 almost 72% of state revenues and 92% of local government
revenues came from general property taxes.6
The evolution of property tax rates over time can be seen in gure 1. This plots the mean
property tax rate by level of government across the whole U.S. As can be seen, the property
tax rate charged by states is just under 50 cents for every $100 dollars of assessed value for this
whole period. In contrast, county level property tax rates jump to about 75 cents per $100 in
1870 and then 
uctuate around this value for the rest of the time frame. Municipal taxes take
o explosively in 1890, reaching $1 per $100 in assessed value in that year and are nearly $1.75
per $100 by 1920. Municipal governments, which include school districts, city governments, and
\special" districts such as irrigation districts, were the dominant source of property taxation by the
early 20th century.
The receipts of this tax were predominantly used for the purchase of public goods such as roads
and schools. Direct redistribution accounted for only 7% of total state, county, and municipal
expenditures in 1890 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1895).7 As Wallis (2001) points out, the success
and longevity of the property tax at the local level is mainly due to the fact that it carefully matches
the beneciaries of public goods with the those paying for them. For many states and localities,
the implicit redistribution involved in many projects led to political objections that could only be
overcome by a clear assignment of taxes to those who would benet from the projects (Wallis,
2003). Thus the public goods that these taxes nanced were not directly redistributive, but rather
were intended to be productive.
6\Local" includes all county, city, municipal, school district, and other sub-state level jurisdictions.
7The category of expenditure is reported as \Charities and Gratuities".
72.2 Data and Initial Analysis
The cross-sectional regressions involve a main sample of 1966 counties, and summary statistics for
all variables are in table 1. The property tax data is from a special supplement to the U.S. Census
of 1890 on wealth, debt, and taxation (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1895). Tax revenues are
the total reported amount of ad valorem property taxes collected within a county. This total is
broken down into several categories based on the taxing authority: state, county, or local (cities,
towns, school districts). In addition, information is provided on taxes levied directly by school
districts or levied by the state specically for school funding. This allows us to distinguish between
property taxation done specically for education purposes versus taxation to fund the remainder
of public goods and government activity. The assessed value of all property (real and personal) is
reported for each county, obtained by the Census from state tax rolls. As dierent states employed
dierent denitions of what constituted real vs. personal property, only their total is utilized. The
true value of property is an estimate of the market value of all real and personal property (which
includes nancial holdings and industrial capital), and the Census obtained this at a county level
through ocial state reports, surveys of counties, and their own estimates. Details of this data can
be found in the appendix.
The measure of inequality is a Gini coecient calculated over farm sizes, obtained from Census
data on the distribution of farms by size. The Agricultural Census of 1890 reports the number of
farms in each of several categories (e.g. 10-19 acres, 20-49 acres, etc.) and this information can be
used to construct a Lorenz curve from which the Gini is calculated. See the appendix for further
details of this calculation.
Additional controls incorporated into some of the regressions are log income per capita, where
output is the sum of county level measures of total farm output and total manufacturing output
from the Census. These two categories are likely to understate total output due to the exclusion of
services, but given the large share of agriculture and manufacturing in total economic output for
the U.S. at this time, the measure surely provides a suitable proxy for output per capita in 1890.
As well, the percent of total population that was black, residing in urban areas (dened as places
8with more than 2,500 persons), and children (dened as between 5-20 years of age) are included.
Finally, Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) propose that the absolute size of a political unit will in
uence
its willingness to fund public goods with large xed costs. Therefore, the log of total population is
included in the regression analysis.
To begin the analysis, table 2 presents OLS regressions relating the various components of
property taxes per person to farm size inequality. The rst three columns of the table include
only the farm Gini as an explanatory variable, as well as state level dummies. All regressions use
clustering at the state level to calculate standard errors.
Column (1) uses the log of tax revenues per capita (lnT=L) as the dependent variable, while
column (2) uses the log of the tax rate (lnT=V ) and column (3) uses the log of wealth per capita
(lnV=L). Reading down the table, it is divided into four panels that correspond to dierent deni-
tions of what tax revenue is used in the calculation of taxes per capita and the tax rate. Panel A
uses the total property tax revenue collected from residents of the county, whether levied by state,
county, or local authorities. Panel B uses only property taxes collected explicitly for the support of
education, whether by the state, county, or local authorities. Panel C measures T=L and T=V using
only locally levied school taxes as the measure of T. Finally, panel D measures taxes as the total
amount of property tax collected, by all authorities, that was not explicitly collected to support
education.8
Looking at panel A, column (1), we see that inequality was positively, but insignicantly, cor-
related with tax revenues per capita. This result, though, hides more interesting relationships
between inequality, tax rates, and wealth. Column (2) of panel A shows that the farm Gini was
negatively, and very signicantly, related to the tax rate. Column (3), on the other hand, shows
a positive, but insignicant, relationship of inequality with wealth per capita. The combination of
these two eects yields the insignicant positive association of inequality and taxes per capita, but
this is not because unequal counties levied high taxes. Rather, unequal counties also tended to be
rich counties, and despite the fact that tax rates were low in these unequal counties, on net they
had slightly higher tax revenues per capita.
8It is possible that some of the taxes in this \Other" category may have been used for education, but it is not
possible to break this category down any further given the data.
9From a political economy perspective, the results in column (2) are of greatest interest. These
link inequality to lower tax rates, the choice variable typically lying at the heart of models of
inequality, redistribution, and growth. The negative association would seem to be prima facie
evidence against the median voter model.
This negative relationship is found again in column (2) of panels B and C of table 2. Here the
denition of tax revenue is limited to only taxes explicitly collected to fund schools (panel B), and
further to only local taxes collected to fund schools (panel C). The size of the coecient estimates
are about twice as large as found in panel A, indicating that inequality and school funding have a
particularly severe inverse correlation in the data.
Contrast this result with that of panel D, where tax revenues are measured as all funds not
explicitly collected for schools. This tax revenue would have funded police forces, sewer projects,
roads, bridges, courts, and all other non-educational public goods. As can be seen, in this case there
is a negative association of inequality and tax rates, but the coecient estimate is only one-fth of
that found using school funding, and the estimate is not close to signicance at typical levels.
Note that in column (3), the estimated relationship of inequality and wealth is identical across
panels. This is due to the fact that regardless of how we dene tax revenues, the base of wealth in a
county remains constant.9 Combining the results for wealth in column (3) with the tax rate results
in column (2) yields the coecient estimates found in column (1). In none of the panels is there a
signicant correlation of inequality and taxes per capita, despite the strong inverse correlation of
inequality and tax rates.
Turning to the remainder of the table, columns (4)-(6) replicate the regressions in the rst three
columns. Added to these regressions are the ve control variables discussed above: log of output per
capita, the percent urban, the percent black, the percent children, and the log of total population.
As can be seen, the general pattern of results is similar to columns (1)-(3), but with several notable
dierences.
First, examining column (5), we see that the absolute value of the estimated coecient has
9More importantly, the wealth subject to taxation was uniform regardless of the taxing authority or the purpose
of the tax. For example, if a farm was assessed at $1000, then the local school district, the county, and the state all
used $1000 as the basis upon which they levied their taxes.
10risen as compared to column (2). That is, once we control for these additional factors, the inverse
correlation of inequality and tax rates actually gets stronger. The signicance of this remains very
high. In particular, in panel D, column (2), we see that inequality is now signicantly and negatively
related to the tax rate associated with \other" public goods aside from schools. The coecient size,
though, remains smaller than the coecients found for the tax rates associated with school funding
in panels B and C. Statistically, one can reject the hypothesis that the coecient in panel D (-0.517)
is the same as the coecient found in panel B (-0.846).
The second important point in columns (4)-(6) comes from the regression for wealth per capita.
Now we see that inequality is signicantly, and positively, associated with wealth per capita. This
correlation is interesting in its own right, but the OLS results cannot identify whether this means
that inequality caused wealth to go up, or whether high wealth generated high inequality.
Finally, note again in column (4) that the simple correlation of inequality and taxes per capita is
not signicantly dierent from zero. Even if these estimates were signicant, it would be incorrect
to interpret the positive coecients as supportive of median voter predictions. From columns (5)
and (6) we see that the positive association of inequality and taxes per capita is driven by the
relationship of inequality and wealth, and in fact those counties with high inequality also tended to
have low tax rates.
Table 2 oers several preliminary results that will be addressed further in the subsequent sec-
tions. It establishes that there is a negative correlation between inequality and the tax rate on
wealth in the United States in 1890. In addition, there appears to be a dierence between taxa-
tion that funds schooling and taxation funding other government activities. In particular, there is
evidence that inequality was worse for school funding than for other types of public goods. Last,
the strength of the relationship between inequality and tax rates appears to be stronger once we
control for several other broad economic and demographic variables.
The major drawback in table 2 is that we cannot say whether inequality actually caused lower
tax rates. Better evidence on the role of inequality in public goods provision requires identifying
exogenous variation in inequality, and the next section discusses the instrumental variable strategy
used to do just that.
112.3 Identifying Exogenous Variation in Inequality
As proposed by Engerman and Sokolo (1997) and Sokolo and Engerman (2000), initial geographic
conditions are expected to be signicant predictors of land inequality. This relationship is thought
to arise from dierentials in scale between types of agriculture, with cash crops such as sugar and
cotton requiring larger farms to achieve the scale necessary to be protable.
For geographic conditions to be useful as an instrument, they need to possess two properties.
First, the geographic instruments should have explanatory power for the endogenous variable, the
farm size Gini. As will be seen, the rst stage results are quite powerful, and the instruments do
explain a signicant portion of the variation in land inequality.
The second property the instruments must possess is to be unrelated to the residual in the
main specication. To be clear, if y = X + " is the specication of interest, then the matrix of
instruments, Z, must satisfy E[Z0"] = 0.
If our dependent variable, y, is the tax rate, then it seems possible that this condition might
hold. Tax rates are a political choice, and geographic characteristics such as rainfall or temperature
do not appear to have much direct bearing on this choice. However, the public goods being funded
may be a reaction to geographic characteristics { for example, irrigation projects in areas with low
rainfall and high temperatures { and we cannot simply assume that E[Z0"] = 0.
With an over-identied specication, as will be the case here, then we can at least test that the
condition E[Z0"] = 0 using the Hansen test. The results will show that it is impossible to reject
the null hypothesis that E[Z0"] = 0. While there is no way to assert absolutely that the geographic
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, the tests suggest that the chosen specications
are suitable.10
The actual climatic data is from the GEOECOLOGY database of Olson, Emerson, and Nungesser
(2003), who provide average monthly temperature, total annual rainfall, latitude, and length of the
growing year in days from the years 1964-1979.11 Logs are taken of rainfall, temperature, and
10Note that this would not be the case if one used wealth per capita as the dependent variable. In this situation
geographic characteristics quite naturally aect wealth directly, and it would be incorrect to them as instruments.
For this reason, it would also be problematic to claim that geographic instruments are appropriate to identify the
role of inequality on tax revenues per capita, as these are closely tied to wealth per capita.
11While the climatic data is from nearly 100 years after the observation of the land distribution data, it seems
12growing period as this was found to improve the t of all regressions.
The four geographic measures are highly correlated with each other, and a concern is that their
joint insignicance is simply a result of multi-collinearity. In results available from the author upon
request, one can exclude each geographic variable in turn from the set of instruments for inequality,
but includes it as a control variable in the second stage, and each is found to be insignicant in this
type of specication. Overall, the use of the geographic instruments appears suitable for identifying
the role of land inequality in determining public goods spending.
2.4 The Eect of Inequality on Tax Rates
Table 3 presents the results of two-stage least squares regressions of the log of the tax rate on
the farm Gini, using the log of annual rainfall, the log of the average temperature, the log of the
growing period, and latitude as instruments. Panel A of the table includes only the farm Gini as
an explanatory variable, while panel B also includes log output per capita, the percent black, the
percent urban, the percent children, and the log of total population.
Before discussing the eects of inequality, consider the diagnostic statistics reported for all
regressions. There are more instruments (4) than endogenous variables (1), so the regressions are
all over-identied. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is performed, with both the
statistic and its p-value reported in the table. In no case can we reject the joint null hypothesis
that all four instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and the p-values show this result is
quite strong.
In addition, the F-statistic testing the joint signicance of the four excluded instruments is
reported for each regression along with the p-value for the null hypothesis that the joint eect of
the instruments is equal to zero. In panel A, without the additional controls, this statistic is 27.15,
showing how strongly the geographic instruments predict variation in the farm Gini. In panel B,
the F-statistic is smaller, but at 12.86 it remains signicant at less that one-tenth of one percent.
It seems clear that the instruments have sucient rst stage strength.
plausible to assume that the weather has not altered radically over that period. In addition, the climatic data on
temperature and rainfall are not incredibly sensitive to human activity, making it unlikely that the agricultural
activities of the last 100 years have altered the conditions.
13Turning to the results of interest, column (1) in panel A uses all tax revenues to calculate the
tax rate. Inequality is seen to have no signicant eect on this overall tax rate. Contrast this to
the results when we examine only school taxes. Column (2), looking at the eect of inequality
on the taxes levied solely for school purposes, shows a signicantly negative eect. This is similar
to column (3), where we consider only taxes levied by local authorities to support schools. The
estimate for local school funding is only signicant at 10%, but is similar in size to the coecient
estimate in column (2). Finally, column (4) looks at taxes used to fund all other public goods, and
nds a negative, but insignicant, result.
Panel B of table 3 replicates the previous regressions, but now includes the ve control additional
control variables. The inclusion of these controls, similar to the OLS results in table 2, increases
the size and signicance of the estimated eect of inequality on tax rates. Column (1) shows that
now inequality has an eect even on overall tax rates, while columns (2) and (3) provide evidence
again that inequality had a strong negative eect on the willingness of counties to fund education.
In column (4), we see again that inequality had a much smaller eect on the provision of public
goods besides education, although statistically one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coecient
estimates in columns (2) and (4) are the same.
The practical size of inequality is quite signicant as well. Moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile in the farm Gini is an increase of about 0.15. Given the results in Panel B, this would
result in a decrease in the overall tax rate of about one-third of one standard deviation. For the
same change in the Gini, the total school tax rate would drop by one-half of one standard deviation,
and the local school tax rate by about one-fourth of a standard deviation.
If we compare these estimates in table 3 to the estimates for tax rates in table 2, we see that
in every case the instrumental variables estimate is larger in absolute value than the OLS. In other
words, the OLS estimates appear biased downward. This suggests several possibilities. First, this
attenuation is consistent with measurement error in the farm size Gini. The Gini is constructed
from Census reports on the number of farms by size categories, but this calculation involves several
assumptions about average farm size within each category. To the extent that counties vary id-
iosyncratically in their average size within categories, the IV method may be providing a correction
14for this problem.
Alternatively, the attenuation of the OLS results could be due to a positive correlation between
the farm Gini and the residual term. Whether this is due to an omitted variable or to reverse
causality is beyond the ability of the data to indicate. If it is reverse causality, then it indicates
that an increase in tax rates is acting to increase inequality.
2.5 Local School Funding
The sample used to this point consists of 1966 counties, within which some local authority (city,
town, or school district) levied taxes explicitly to support schools. However, not every county in the
U.S. in 1890 had local school taxation. For an additional 337 counties that we have data for, schools
were funded from the state or county level only. The purpose of this section is to examine whether
the addition of these counties changes our conclusions regarding the relationship of inequality and
public goods spending.
The 337 counties dier substantially from the original sample. The average farm Gini in the 337
counties is 0.605, while it is just 0.529 in the larger sample. Per capita income in the 337 counties
is only $52, while in the larger sample it is $86. The counties without local school funding are
predominantly Southern.12 So it is of some interest whether they t within the pattern established
so far that higher inequality leads to lower public spending on education.
To address this it is necessary to alter the specication slightly. Previously the dependent
variable was the log of the tax rate, lnT V . This obviously is undened for counties where local
school taxes are zero. So in this section we will consider the level of the tax rate, T=V , as the
dependent variable.
Table 4 reports two-stage least squares regressions of the tax rate on the farm Gini, using the
same four geographic variables as instruments. Column (1) includes all 2303 counties, and denes
taxes, T, as the total tax revenue collected specically for schools, whether local, county, or state.
Panel A reports the results when no control variables are included, and Panel B reports results
12The breakdown of the 337 counties is as follows: Alabama (51), Georgia (106), Kentucky (2), Louisiana (19),
Minnesota (2), North Carolina (72), South Carolina (8), South Dakota (2), Tennessee (1), and Texas (74).
15with them included. As can be seen, there is a signicant negative relationship of inequality on the
overall school tax rate. This eect is, as before, larger when the control variables are included.
Column (2) replicates these specications, but limits the sample to only those 337 counties
within which there was no local school funding. As can be seen, without controls there is a positive,
but insignicant relationship of inequality to school funding. However, once we control for the other
characteristics of counties in panel B, we see a signicant negative relationship. The absolute value
of the point estimate is smaller than in column (1), indicating that the eect of inequality is less in
those counties without local funding.
By comparison, column (3) shows the strong negative eect of farm inequality on school taxation
for the original sample of 1966 counties. Comparing the results in column (3) to column (1), it does
not appear that restricting the sample to the original 1966 counties is the reason for the negative
relationship observed. Even allowing for the presence of the 337 counties with no local funding we
obtain similar estimates.
Column (4) limits the denition of taxes to only locally levied school taxes, but includes all 2303
counties in the regression. Thus the 337 observations without local funding all have a dependent
variable equal to zero. In this framework, we see again a strongly signicant negative impact
of inequality on school funding. It does not appear that the 337 additional counties, despite their
many inherent dierences with the main sample, are operating with a dierent relationship between
inequality and school funding.
Finally, column (5) considers the results when all counties are included, and the tax rate is based
on all non-school taxes. In this case, we see negative but very insignicant relationships between
inequality and tax rates. Similar to previous results, inequality is not relevant to the determination
of taxes funding public goods other than those of schools.
3 Property Taxation and the Median Voter
The empirical results indicate that property taxes were lower when land inequality was higher. This
held most strongly for education as compared to spending on non-educational public goods. These
16results suggest one reason places with high inequality lagged in the provision of education and
ultimately in economic growth. The fact that the results dier so signicantly between education
funding and non-education funding supports work by Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2008), who predict
that land inequality will delay education reform, but not public goods spending that benets both
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (e.g. roads).
To the extent that land inequality proxies for overall wealth inequality (and in 1890 this seems
like a fair assumption to make), these results also appear to contradict the predictions of simple
median voter models.13 Does this evidence oer further evidence against the median voter model,
or is there another explanation that can reconcile the theory with the evidence?14
The median voter model typically assumes that all wealth is taxed uniformly. However, in the
U.S. during this period the actual implementation of the property tax meant that all wealth was
not taxed at the same rate. In fact, property taxes tended to be quite regressive. This was noticed
and argued against throughout this era. Seligman (1969), originally writing in 1895, described the
general property tax as \one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world," (p. 62) and led him
to conclude that, \It is the cause of such crying injustice that its alteration or its abolition must
become the battle cry of every statesman or reformer." (p. 62) The defects of the general property
tax, as argued at the time, included the following: a) a lack of uniformity, or an inequality of
assessment across individuals and counties, b) a lack of universality, primarily the failure to reach
personal property, and c) regressivity, as wealthier individuals tended to hold a greater proportion
13The primary references connecting inequality and public goods are Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Persson and
Tabellini (1994). Variants of the median voter model that focus specically on inequality and redistribution through
education funding include Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Benabou (1996), and
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998).
14An alternate explanation would be that within the U.S. in 1890, the median voter assumption is not correct
because surage was limited by wealth. However, at this point in U.S. history, voting was relatively widespread.
Most importantly for our purposes, surage was not limited by property rights. Generally speaking, those who paid
taxes could vote on taxes. Williamson (1960) documents that by 1860 property tests had essentially disappeared,
and that the demise of these rules was an outgrowth of the Jacksonian democracy movement of the early 1800's.
Keyssar (2000) presents a detailed assessment of the various restrictions in force and they can be summarized into
several main categories. First, citizenship requirements generally meant that a male had to have been resident in a
state for one year before he received the right to vote, and these waiting periods were often shorter for municipalities.
Secondly, many states and localities required that a person be current on their taxes in order to vote. Finally, literacy
tests were common, especially in the South where they served primarily to disenfranchise black voters. Given that
we controlled for the black population percentage in the empirical work, it does not appear that the negative eect of
inequality was just a proxy for limited black voting rights. The other restrictions did not, in practice, disenfranchise
many voters, according to Keyssar and Willamson.
17of personalty as opposed to realty, and their total wealth was therefore taxed at a lower rate than
poor individuals (Seligman, 1969; Leland, 1928; Fisher, 1996).15
One of the main structural issues that led to these objections was the increasing share of person-
alty in total wealth as the economy developed and nancial capital rose in proportion to the value
of land. While capital and nancial goods were generally easy to value given market prices, they
were easy to hide. Thus Benson (1965) notes that in 1850 the total assessed value of all property
in the U.S. was equal to 84.4% of the estimated true value of property. By 1870 already this share
was down to 47.2% and in 1890 it was only 39.2%. In fact, while the assessed value of real estate
more than doubled between 1860 and 1880, the assessed value of personalty actually decreased by
24% over the same period. Some of this could be attributed to the Civil War, but Benson suggests
this is hardly sucient to explain the entire amount. Consider that in 1884, Cook County, Illinois
(consisting of Chicago and environs) reported a total of less than $383,000 in personal property,
despite bank deposits reported well into the tens of millions of dollars (Benson, 1965). By 1911 the
reported value of all real estate in New York City was over nine and half billion dollars, while the
total reported value of all personal property (which included all nancial assets as well as household
goods) was well under one-half of a billion dollars (Seligman, 1969).
These trends can be seen in gure 2. The log total value of all property (real and personal) per
capita is plotted between 1860{1920, along with the log of assessed realty value per capita and the
log of assessed personalty value per capita. As can be seen, the value of personalty actually dips
in 1870 and 1880 before climbing slowly through 1920. The value of realty dips very slightly in
this period and then continues its general upward drift. Overlaying this information is the overall
assessment rate, or the assessed value of all property relative to its true value, as estimated by the
15To try and achieve uniformity, between 1840 and 1900 twenty-two states inserted uniformity provisions into
their state constitutions, which added to the ve states with existing provisions in force in 1840 (Benson, 1965).
Uniformity was often seen as symbolizing something beyond property taxation, and was linked to the very concept of
democracy itself and the urge for equality of all citizens (and their property) before the law (Benson 1965). Similar to
uniformity, many states included universality clauses in their constitutions. The main intention of the clauses was to
include personalty or intangible property (e.g. nancial assets and industrial capital) in the tax base alongside realty
(e.g. land). Benson (1965) notes that this universality movement was primarily a phenomenon of the South and
West, areas in which real estate was the dominant form of wealth and landowners were anxious to nd other sources
of revenue. Twenty-one states added constitutional provisions for universality into their constitutions between 1840
and 1900, many of them specically identifying bank notes, money, investments, and personal property as objects of
the general property tax.
18Census bureau. This rate declines from nearly 80% in 1860 and drops dramatically to around 40%,
where it stays throughout most of this time period.
A result of the problem of assessing personal property was the inequality in assessments that
existed across individuals. It was generally true that, \the property of the small owner, as a rule,
is valued by a far higher standard than that of his wealthy neighbor," (Seligman, 1895, p.29).
Leland (1928) documents that in Wisconsin in 1912, farms valued at under $1000 were assessed at
100% of their market value, and that this assessment decreased steadily by the size of estate until
estates of more than $500,000 in value were assessed at only 28%. Similarly in Virginia in 1914, the
assessment to sales price of rural properties was 46.7% for those under $500, but only 28% for those
greater than $10,000. This type of pattern held for personal property as well, and there was also
a distinction between rural and urban areas. In cities, assessments were closer to the sale value of
real estate in both Virginia and Kansas (Leland, 1928). Figure 3 graphs the data given by Leland
for Wisconsin and Virginia, and shows distinctly that the assessment rate is negatively, and in a
convex manner, related to the size of the estate.
This regressivity appears to be a consistent feature of property taxation across the U.S. during
this period. Even if we ignore the within county inequality, there exists a regressive relationship
between assessments and true values across counties. Table 5 estimates the relationship of the log
of total assessed property value, by county, to the log of total true value of property. As can be seen
in column (1), the estimated coecient is less than one, showing that assessments fell as counties
became richer. The estimate is tight enough to reject the hypothesis that the true coecient is
equal to one, indicating fair taxation.
Column (2) of the table includes the farm Gini as an additional control. The farm Gini is in-
strumented for using the log of the growing period, while the log of true property value is assumed
to be exogenous.16 As can be seen, there is a signicant positive eect of inequality on the total
assessment, given wealth. This is consistent with the regressivity of property taxation within coun-
ties. A greater dispersion of farm sizes within a county, holding the total wealth constant, should
raise the average assessment rate given the convex relationship identied in gure 3.
16Only the log of growing period is used as an instrument because it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of
over-identication when additional instruments were used.
19The last two columns of table 5 incorporate the other ve control variables used previously and
show that the degree of regressivity in the property tax system was even larger once these factors
(income, racial composition, urbanization, age structure, and total population size) are controlled
for. The coecient on the true property value falls to only 0.596, indicating that a doubling of the
true property value in a county only raised the assessed value of property by 50%. Again, if we
include the farm Gini, as in column (4), we see a signicant (at 10%) positive eect of inequality
on assessments, consistent with the regressive tax.
This evidence shows quite clearly that property taxes during this period were regressive. Those
at the lower end of the wealth distribution were paying higher eective tax rates than those at the
top due to the declining assessment rate. Thus a basic assumption of the median voter model does
not hold in this context, and it would be incorrect to use these results to indict the basic forms of
such models.
However, in a suitably modied version of the median voter model of Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
it can be shown that the actual relationship between inequality and tax rates depends upon the
redistributive nature of the tax itself (see the Appendix). With suciently regressive taxation the
median voter will predict a negative relationship between inequality and tax rates.
This highlights the issues that arise when attempting to empirically assess the median voter
model. Prior work has essentially regressed the tax rate (often approximated as government spend-
ing relative to GDP) on inequality. If the authors found a negative relationship between the two,
they interpreted this as a rejection of the median voter model. But without knowing the nature of
the tax system, this negative relationship may actually be perfectly consistent with median voter
predictions. Beyond this issue, cross-country evidence seems likely to be plagued by the fact that
countries will dier in how regressive their taxation is, and if this is the case then the evidence
presented cannot be usefully interpreted at all.
The current paper nds that inequality and public goods spending are negatively related, condi-
tional on there being a regressive tax structure. This is perfectly consistent with the median voter
model. Given the advantages this data has over cross-country studies, this suggests that we should
not dismiss the median voter model too quickly. Of course the regressive nature of the tax system
20itself should be subject to median voter considerations. Benabou (2000, 2005) provides a model in
which inequality is operative in determining the tax system itself, and there is nothing in his model
to preclude regressive taxation under certain circumstances. To examine this in the data, though,
would require one to regress measures of regressivity on measures of inequality. The point of this is
that we cannot usefully interpret evidence on public goods and inequality unless we have knowledge
of the tax structure in the rst place. The evidence presented in this paper shows that inequality
acted to lower tax rates across U.S. counties, providing some explanation for why unequal areas of
the U.S. lagged in education and growth. It does not necessarily, though, provide evidence against
the median voter hypothesis.
4 Conclusion
The distribution of wealth is often through to have ramications for the process of development.
In particular, research has suggested that inequality may be important for the provision of growth-
enhancing public goods such as schools and roads. The period between 1860 and 1920 in the
U.S. is an ideal environment within which to test such hypotheses because taxation on wealth
(property) was the primary source of funding for the vast expansion in public spending that took
place alongside industrialization.
A cross-sectional analysis of U.S. county-level data in 1890 provides several clear conclusions
on the eect of inequality on public goods provision. First, inequality did lower overall property
tax rates. Second, this eect was driven almost entirely by the eect of inequality on school
funding, while there was no eect of inequality on non-school funding. The identication of these
relationships was achieved through the use of geographic variable as instruments for inequality,
inspired by the historical arguments of Engerman and Sokolo, and veried empirically.
The eect of inequality was dramatic. The dierence between the a county at the 90th and the
10th percentile of the inequality distribution was a decrease in tax rates by one half. The ndings
lend empirical weight to the previous work of Sokolo and Zolt (2005) on historical tax mechanisms
in the Western Hemisphere, as well as the work of Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2008) on the impact
21of land inequality on human capital formation.
The general nding that inequality lowered tax rates on wealth would appear to be in con
ict
with simple median voter models. Historically, though, property tax assessments were highly re-
gressive and incorporating this fact into a median voter model shows that the empirical results are
consistent with this type of political system. The results suggest several interesting questions. Why
were property taxes so regressive to begin with? Was inequality responsible for this feature? Why
was inequality so detrimental to schooling relative to other types of public goods? How did the
further development of the economy, by increasing the value of capital relative to land, aect the
provision of public goods? The importance of these public goods for the subsequent development
of the U.S. makes the answers to these questions an intriguing area of research.
22Appendices
A Land Distribution Measures
Farm Land Distribution
The method of measuring land inequality follows the methodology used by Deininger and Squire
(1998) in their study of cross-country inequality. From the Agricultural Census of 1890 distribution
of farms by size is available. The categories of size are as follows: under 10 acres, 10-19 acres, 20-49
acres, 50-99 acres, 100-499 acres, 500-999 acres, and greater than 1000 acres. This distribution,
combined with assumptions about the average area of farms within each category, allows for the
estimation of a Gini coecient.
A more formal denition is as follows. There are eight size categories, including a placeholder
category that measures farms of size zero (set equal to zero), numbered from 1 to 8 in order of
increasing size of farms. Let fi be the share of all farms that are in category i. Let ai be the share
of all acreage that is in category i. Now let Fi =
Pi
s=1 fs, which denotes the share of farms that
are of size i or smaller. Similarily, Ai =
Pi
s=1 as. By denition, F8 = A8 = 1. It can be shown
that the Gini coecient, G, can be calculated as follows
G = 1  
8 X
i=1
(Fi+1   Fi)(Ai+1 + Ai): (3)
This method requires data on the share of acreage in each farm size category, which is not
actually reported in the census of 1890. In the absence of this data, it is assumed that each farm
within a category is the average number of acres for that category. Therefore, the size of all farms
in the 10-19 acre category is assumed to be 14.5 acres. This method conforms to the evidence found
in the 1920 Agricultural Census, which actually reports acreage data by category. This leaves the
category of farms greater than 1000 acres. For these farms, it is assumed that each farm is actually
1000 acres. Various values for this category were tested, and there were never signicant changes
in the Gini coecients.
B Public Finance Data
1860. Data comes from the U.S. Department of the Interior (1866). The assessed value of both real
estate and personal property was recorded by state in Table 1 of the Miscellaneous section. In this
table, as is the case for all subsequent years, the value of property belonging directly to the United
States or to an individual state itself is not counted. Tax values are reported in an unnumbered
table (page 511) in the Miscellaneous section. The values reported are total taxes received, and
it is not specied what amount is accounted for by property taxes. Taxes are distinguished by
purpose or level of collection: state, county, city, town, school, poor, road, and miscellaneous. For
the purposed of this paper, state and county taxes are exactly as reported, while municipal taxes
is the sum of all other categories reported. For a variety of observations, no number is reported.
For example, in Florida no poor taxes or road taxes are reported. This does not mean that taxes
were not collected for these purposes, only that Florida did not distinguish these funds from more
23general categories like state, county, city or town taxes.
1870. Data is again from the U.S. Department of the Interior (1872) in the subsection \Wealth,
Taxation and Public Indebtedness in the United States." Table 1 of this section lists the assessed
value of both real estate and personal estate, as well as an estimate of the true valuation of total
real and personal estate. The true valuation is an estimate by the marshals assigned to conduct
the census of the market value of the property being counted. Taxes are not specically reported
as property taxes, but the total values for 1870 match the aggregates reported in later Census
publications that refer to ad valorem taxation of property, so it is assumed that this report re
ects
property taxation. Breakdowns are given by state, county, and \town, city, etc.". This nal category
is treated as municipal taxes in this paper.
1880. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Oce (1884) reports in Table II a summary
of the assessed valuation and taxation by level of government. Assessed valuation is given for real
estate and personal property. Taxation is reported for state, county, and "minor civil divisions less
than counties exclusive of school districts" and school districts. For state, count, and the minor
divisions, a distinction is made between taxes levied for schools and taxes levied for other purposes.
Similar to 1870, taxes are not denoted as property taxes, but later reports of the Census suggest
that these totals are in fact ad valorem property taxes. In each case, both the minor division and
school taxes are combined to arrive at municipal taxes.
There are several adjustments necessary given notes to Table II. In particular, the values in
Table II do not include amounts of tax collected in several states (Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa,
Minnesota, and Kansas) that were reported by townships but included school taxes. Footnotes to
the table report the total value of these taxes, and these are added to the municipal tax category
used in this paper. Table XVI of the same report lists estimated true valuation of property by
state, which is taken directly for use in this paper.
1890. U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Oce (1895) in table 3 reports the true valuation
of real and personal property by state. Table 5 of the same report oers the assessed value of real
estate and personal property. In addition, it contains data on the ad valorem taxation done on
property. The total levy, except for schools, is reported for state, county, and municipal units of
government. For schools, a state total and a \county and minor division" total is reported. For
this paper, state taxes are the total state taxes levied, county taxes are the non-school county taxes
levied, and municipal taxes are the municipal taxes levied exclusive of schools combined with the
county and municipal taxes levied for schools. The combination of the county school taxes with
municipal taxes is felt to be acceptable given the generally low level of county school taxation that
took place across states during this period.
1900. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1907) is a similar report to that
of 1890. The major note to this data is that it is from 1902, not from 1900. Table 8 reports the
assessed value of real property, personal property and \other" property. For the purposes of this
paper, personal property and \other" property are lumped together as personal property. This
table also reports a breakdown of ad valorem taxes on property similar to that found in 1890.
Levies other than for school purposes are reported by state, county, and municipal levels. Levies
for schools are reported for state and \county and minor civil divisions". The total state tax is
the sum of the state values, county tax is solely the non-school county taxes, and municipal taxes
are the sum of municipal non-school levies and the \county and minor divisions" school taxes.
Similar to 1890, the combination of county school taxes in the municipal aggregate is not felt to be
signicant given the small size of county school taxes at this time. Table 15 reports the estimated
true valuation of all property, broken down by real and personal.
241910. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1915) reports on public
nances for the year of 1912. Table 7 in the section on the assessed value of property reports the
value of real property, personal property, and \other" property. For several states (Ohio, Indiana,
Alabama) the total of other property is included with personal property. As this is how personal
property is calculated in this paper for all states, this does not create an issue. For Maryland,
personal property is included with real property. All results in the paper are robust to the exclusion
of Maryland in 1910 from the sample. For Arkansas, other property is divided up between real and
personal property categories. The results are not aected by the exclusion of Arkansas from the
sample either. This same table also includes ad valorem taxation on property for states (both school
and non-school), counties (both school and non-school) and other civil division (both school and
non-school). These fall directly into the categories used in this paper: state, county and municipal.
1920. The report of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1924) is for 1922.
The report on Taxation lists in table 4 the estimated true value of real property and improvements
by state. Assessed valuation of real, personal, and other property is found in table 7, along with
levies of property taxes for states, counties, and all other civil divisions. No distinction is made
here regarding school versus non-school taxation. The other civil divisions category includes school
districts. True value of property is from the National Wealth report, table 7.
1930. From the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1935), which obtained data from the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1933) and has values for 1932. Table 212 lists
the assessed value of real and personal property by state. Table 214 lists the revenue receipts of
counties, from which I select the totals for \general property taxes". From the same table a similar
value can be obtained for municipal governments, dened as \cities, towns, villages, and boroughs".
Table 215 allows for the collection of the same variable at the state level. Data on the true valuation
of property was not available.
C Regressive Taxes and Median Voters
Consider a very simple model along the lines of Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Population is normalized
to one, and aggregate (as well as per capita) output is
y = Akg1  (4)
where k is the aggregate capital stock and g is the amount of public goods provided. The economy
consists of one rm operating under perfect competition, taking g as given, so that the wage rate
and the rate of return on capital are
w = (1   )Akg1  (5a)
r = Ak 1g1  (5b)
The public good is funded by a tax rate of () on the assessed value (a) of the capital stock so that
g = a. Note that the assessed value will not necessarily be exactly equal to the capital stock.
An individual's income depends on their wage income, which is identical across all individuals,
plus the return to their personal capital, minus the tax on the assessed value of their personal
capital,
yi = w + rki   ai: (6)
25If the assessed value of personal capital is exactly equal to ki, then this simply reduces to the model
as originally written by Alesina and Rodrik. The net return on capital for an individual is then
r  , and as this is identical across all individuals, all individuals make the same choice of savings
rates, and so there is no change in the distribution of capital across individuals over time.
To introduce redistribution into this analysis, let us assume that the assessed value of capital is





and the value of 
 2 ( 1;1). The aggregate assessment is simply a =
P
i ai and the aggregate
capital stock is k =
P
i ki. To see the eect of dierent values of 








As can be seen, if 
 > 0 then the assessment rate on personal property is progressive, or increasing
in the amount of personal capital. However, if 
 < 0, then assessment rates are regressive and an
increase in the amount of personal capital results in a lower assessment rate. A value of 
 =  1
implies a simple head tax. In the specic case that 
 = 0 then each person has an assessment of
ai = ki, as in the original Alesina and Rodrik model.
So what is the optimal tax rate from the perspective of individual i? Let us assume only that
the individual is interested in maximizing income. The individual is presumed to be inconsequential
enough to ignore the eect of their choice on the level of k or the assessment rate a=k. Using g = a
along with (5a) and (5b) in equation (6) we get
yi = (1   )Ak (a)
1  + Ak 1 (a)
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and the relationship of 
i to ki depends on the size of 
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In the median voter model, the tax rate implemented will be equal to the optimal tax rate
of the median individual, who holds km in assets. Assuming that there is some inequality in the
distribution of assets, then it must be the case that km < k, or the median individual has fewer assets
than the average individual. A natural measure of inequality is then the ratio k=km. Increasing
values of k=km indicate increasing inequality.
The question now is how the optimal tax rate changes with inequality. Holding k constant, it
can be shown that the relationship of k=km to the implemented tax rate, m, depends crucially on
regressiveness of the tax itself. If 
 =  1 then we have a head tax, and m declines as inequality
(k=km) increases. If taxes are regressive and  1 < 
 <  1 then taxes will decline with inequality
up to a point. As long as k=km < 
=((1   )( 
   1)) then taxes fall as inequality increases.
Once inequality is high enough to cross this threshold, then the median voter has so little wealth
that the punitive tax rate does not oset the gains they get to wages from voting for more public
goods. Finally, if 
 >    1, then taxes increase with inequality no matter initial inequality.
The important point is that for some combinations of 
 and k=km, the relationship between
26inequality and taxes is negative, even though there is full voting and the median voter decides the
tax rate.
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37Table 1: County Level Summary Statistics, 1890
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Property tax and wealth data:
Total taxes per capita ($) 5.900 4.782 0.441 73.203
All school taxes per capita ($) 1.942 1.577 0.102 16.068
Local school taxes per capita ($) 1.628 1.465 0.002 10.885
Other taxes per capita ($) 3.957 3.529 0.059 57.135
Total tax rate 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.093
School tax rate 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.040
Local school tax rate 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.037
Other tax rate 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.086
Total wealth per capita ($) 501.199 489.242 61.627 9182.882
Inequality and other control data:
Farm Gini 0.529 0.147 0.033 0.926
Log output per capita 4.455 0.648 2.220 6.986
Proportion black 0.118 0.199 0.000 0.940
Proportion urban 0.134 0.211 0.000 1.000
Proportion children 0.379 0.044 0.209 0.466
Log of total population 9.706 0.927 4.890 14.231
Geographic controls:
Avg. annual temperature (C) 12.150 3.982 3.000 23.800
Total annual rainfall (cm) 98.140 24.842 19.100 175.100
Length growing period (days) 180.426 39.808 81.000 345.000
Latitude (degrees) 38.929 4.200 25.535 48.794
Notes: All variables have 1966 observations. Property tax and wealth data is from the U.S. Census Report on Wealth,
Debt, and Taxation, U.S. Department of the Interior (1895). Total taxes per capita are the total of all ad valorem
taxes collected within a county, by any level of government, divided by county population. School taxes are the
subset of taxes collected explicitly to fund education. Local school taxes are a subset of school taxes collected only
by municipal or school district authorities. The other taxes are simply total taxes minus school taxes. Tax rates are
calculated as the total tax revenue in the county divided by total wealth. The farm Gini is calculated from farm
size information in the U.S. Census of 1890. Output per capita is the sum of manufacturing output and agricultural
output, as reported in the U.S. Census of 1890. Demographic variables are from the U.S. Census. Geographic
variables are obtained from the GEOECOLOGY database of Olson et al (2003). See the appendix for more detail
on the construction of all variables.
38Table 2: OLS Regressions for County Property Taxes on Inequality, 1890
Dependent Variables:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnT=L lnT=V lnV=L lnT=L lnT=V lnV=L
(Taxes p.c.) (Tax rate) (Wealth p.c.) (Taxes p.c.) (Tax rate) (Wealth p.c.)
= (2)+(3) = (5)+(6)
Panel A: T = Total Property Tax Revenue
Farm Gini 0.274 -0.337** 0.611 0.284 -0.634*** 0.918***
(0.440) (0.159) (0.374) (0.278) (0.125) (0.256)
R-squared 0.634 0.348 0.529 0.810 0.390 0.718
Panel B: T = All School Property Tax Revenue
Farm Gini -0.138 -0.749*** 0.611 0.072 -0.846*** 0.918***
(0.442) (0.221) (0.374) (0.315) (0.224) (0.256)
R-squared 0.734 0.539 0.529 0.830 0.552 0.718
Panel C: T = Local School Property Tax Revenue
Farm Gini -0.078 -0.689*** 0.611 0.027 -0.891*** 0.918***
(0.461) (0.246) (0.374) (0.321) (0.244) (0.256)
R-squared 0.753 0.661 0.529 0.816 0.665 0.718
Panel D: T = Other Property Tax Revenue
Farm Gini 0.460 -0.151 0.611 0.401 -0.517*** 0.918***
(0.441) (0.156) (0.374) (0.278) (0.122) (0.256)
R-squared 0.550 0.266 0.529 0.747 0.323 0.718
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions have 1966 observations and include state xed eects. Standard errors, clustered at the state
level, are reported in parentheses. * denotes signicance at 10%, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%. The panels
vary on the measure of property tax revenue used, and the categories are discussed in the text. Note that results
for wealth per capita (V=L) do not vary by panel as the wealth is not contingent on the type of tax collected. Tax
and wealth data are from U.S. Census special reports, and the Farm Gini is calculated from U.S. Census data on
farm sizes (see text). The nal three columns include additional control variables: the log of output per capita, the
percent urban, the percent black, the percent of children, and the log of total population. See the appendix for the
sources of these variables.
39Table 3: Instrumental Variable Regressions for Log Property Tax Rates on Inequality, 1890
Dependent Variable is the log of the tax rate: lnT=V
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All taxes All School Local School Other Taxes
Taxes Taxes
Panel A: No additional controls
Farm Gini -0.524 -1.013** -0.948* -0.240
(0.437) (0.507) (0.542) (0.438)
Hansen J-stat 0.408 1.822 2.315 0.157
Hansen p-value 0.939 0.610 0.510 0.984
First stage F-stat 27.146 27.146 27.146 27.146
First stage p-value < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Panel B: All additional controls
Farm Gini -1.178** -1.540** -1.446** -0.871
(0.509) (0.628) (0.655) (0.538)
Hansen J-stat 0.526 2.222 2.687 0.671
Hansen p-value 0.913 0.528 0.442 0.880
First stage F-stat 12.863 12.863 12.863 12.863
First stage p-value < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. * denotes signicance at 10%,
** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%. All regressions have 1966 observations and include state xed eects. The
excluded instruments in each regression are the log annual rainfall, the log of annual temperature, the log of the
growing period, and latitude, all obtained from the GEOECOLOGY database of Olson et al (2003). Panel B includes
log output per capita, the percent urban, the percent black, the percent children, and the log of total population
as additional controls. See the appendix for the source of these control variables. The dependent variable in each
column is the eective tax rate, T=V , where T is the total amount of tax collected, and V is total wealth. T varies
over the columns based on which taxes are used in the calculation. Tax and wealth data are from special U.S. Census
reports, see the text for details. For both panels, the Hansen J statistic is distributed 2(3) and the rst stage F
statistic is distributed F(4;35).
40Table 4: Instrumental Variable Regressions for Property Tax Rates on Inequality, Expanded Sample,
1890
Dependent Variable is the level of the tax rate: T=V
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All School All School All School Local School Other Taxes
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
Panel A: No additional controls
Farm Gini -0.0057** 0.0018 -0.0079*** -0.0063*** -0.0008
(0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0052)
Hansen J-stat 2.754 0.692 2.072 2.390 1.232
Hansen p-value 0.431 0.874 0.557 0.495 0.745
First stage F-stat 21.724 40.800 27.145 21.724 21.724
First stage p-value < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Panel B: All additional controls
Farm Gini -0.0115*** -0.0029** -0.0103*** -0.0127*** -0.0088
(0.0040) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0075)
Hansen J-stat 1.923 3.642 2.313 1.672 3.730
Hansen p-value 0.588 0.302 0.509 0.643 0.292
First stage F-stat 5.253 12.576 12.862 5.253 5.253
First stage p-value 0.002 0.001 < 0:001 0.002 0.002
Sample Information
Included counties All Local school Local school All All
taxes = 0 taxes > 0
N 2303 337 1966 2303 2303
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. * denotes signicance at 10%,
** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%. All regressions include state xed eects. The excluded instruments in each
regression are the log annual rainfall, the log of annual temperature, the log of the growing period, and latitude,
all obtained from the GEOECOLOGY database of Olson et al (2003). Panel B includes log output per capita, the
percent urban, the percent black, the percent children, and the log of total population as additional controls. See the
appendix for the source of these control variables. The dependent variable in each column is the eective tax rate,
T=V , where T is the total amount of tax collected, and V is total wealth. T varies over the columns based on which
taxes are used in the calculation. Tax and wealth data are from special U.S. Census reports, see the text for details.
For all regressions, the Hansen J statistic is distributed 2(3). The rst stage F statistic is distributed F(4;35) in
columns (1),(3)-(5), and F(4;9) in column (2).
41Table 5: Regressions for Assessment Rate, 1890
Dep. Variable is log of the assessed prop. val.:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log true prop. value () 0.894*** 0.828*** 0.596*** 0.540***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.049) (0.052)
Farm Gini 1.399** 1.359*
(0.578) (0.737)
Additional controls? No No Yes Yes
First stage F-stat 16.69 22.86
First stage p-value < 0:001 < 0:001
F-test stat for  = 1 26.38 53.59 66.78 78.28
F-test p-value < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. * denotes signicance at 10%, **
denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%. All regressions have 1966 observations and include state xed eects. Additional
controls are log output per capita, the percent urban, the percent black, the percent children, and the log of total
population as additional controls. See the appendix for the source of these control variables. The dependent variable
is the log of total assessed property value, while the \true" value is the reported market value of property. Assessment
and wealth data are from special U.S. Census reports, see the text for details. The F-test tests the hypothesis that
the coecient on the log of true value, , is equal to one. The statistic is distributed F(1;35). The value of Farm
Gini is instrumented for in columns (2) and (4) using the log of the growing period (in days), obtained from the
GEOECOLOGY database, see text.
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